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There is consensus in the economic literature that the reserve requirements 
are a tax levied upon financial intermediation, yet the incidence of the tax 
remains controversial. In this paper, we test whether changes in reserve 
requirements in Brazil impact the stock returns of the financial system 
distinctly from the rest of the economy. We find evidence that Brazilian 
bank stock returns were affected by changes in reserve requirements on both 
time deposits and transaction accounts, which implies that the tax burden of 
required reserves was not fully passed through to banks’ borrowers or 
clients. Stock returns of non-financial firms were also affected by these 
changes, suggesting that in some cases, reserve requirements on time 
deposits and transaction accounts served as a non-neutral instrument of 
monetary or fiscal policy in Brazil.  
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Introduction 
 
Reserve requirements serve a number of purposes. Policymakers have 
extensively called upon their role as a monetary policy instrument to justify higher 
ratios or higher incidence, relying on theoretical arguments that they may help stabilize 
the demand for money (Hardy, 1997), prices (Siegel, 1981), the demand for goods 
(Bental and Eden, 2002), or the output gap under certain types of shocks to the economy 
(Baltensperger, 1982). Several other papers dispute this stabilizing function, especially 
when monetary policy does not target monetary aggregates, yet policymakers around 
the world, particularly in economies lacking fully fledged securities’ markets, still see 
them as a feasible alternative to stabilize inflation or output.  
Reserve requirements may also contribute to prudential regulation. Bris and 
Cantale (2003) show that positive reserve requirement ratios help restore market 
efficiency when there are external agency problems, i.e., when banks have incentives to 
take excessive risks but credit risk cannot be directly observed by regulators. In 
contrast, reductions in reserve requirements may help restore the efficient equilibrium in 
circumstances where banks have incentives to take insufficient risks, regulators cannot 
observe credit risk, and bank owners cannot perfectly assess managers’ efforts.  
Some authors advocate that the driving motive for the introduction of reserve 
requirements was in fact their fiscal role (De Kock 1964, and Goodfriend and Hargraves 
1983, for the US). In the Brazilian case, Fernandes (1992) mentions a number of 
occasions when fiscal concerns affected reserve requirement decisions. As of 2007, if 
the government were to invest the balance of non-interest bearing reserve deposits at the 
central bank at a benchmark reference rate, interest accrued to these deposits would 
account for about 1% of federal government monthly revenues. The series shows a peak 
at 7% in November 1998 (Figures 1 and 2). In addition, issuing ordinary debt is much 
costlier than maintaining required bank reserves at the central bank (Table 1). 
Reserve requirements are a tax on financial intermediation when interest accrued 
to required reserves deposited at the central bank is lower than the rates of return on 
alternative bank investment. Although the question “who pays the tax?” is of relevance 
to any study of economic distortions or fair income allocation, the literature has not yet 
reached an agreement on the answer. Black (1975) and Fabozzi and Thurston (1986) 
argue that the incidence of the tax falls entirely on depositors. Fama (1975) and James 
(1987), on the other hand, do not find any relation between reserve requirement ratios   5 
and interest rates paid on bank deposits in the US. Fama thus infers that the tax is 
entirely transferred to borrowers, and James finds empirical evidence supporting Fama’s 
argument. 
More recently, the literature has been focusing on the possibility that the tax 
burden of reserve requirements be mutually shared by depositors, borrowers and banks’ 
shareholders. On theoretical grounds, Davis and Toma (1995) find that borrowers and 
stockholders may share the burden of reserve requirements altogether in a framework 
where banks have comparative advantage in monitoring loans and assessing the risk of 
potential borrowers. On empirical grounds, Kolari, Mahajan and Saunders (1988), 
Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1990), Osborne and Zaher (1992), Cosimano and 
McDonald (1998), and Hein and Stewart (2002, 2003) all find evidence supporting the 
argument of shared incidence in the US. 
The literature on the Brazilian case has focused on the question of whether 
reserve requirements affect the interest spreads on loans advanced by banks to their 
clients. If they do, as is the case in Cardoso (2003), the literature concludes that the tax 
burden of reserve requirements is passed through to borrowers. A number of studies 
produced by Central Bank of Brazil’s staff have in fact assumed that the incidence of 
the tax falls entirely on borrowers
1.  
Cardoso and Koyama (1999) argue that default ratios and operational costs are 
the main determinants of bank spreads in Brazil, and show that the ratios of reserve 
requirement on time deposits matter little to bank interest spreads because required 
reserves on time deposits accrue interest at the central bank. They thus infer that reserve 
requirements on time deposits are not passed through to borrowers. 
To take a more straightforward stance on the issue of who really pays the tax 
implied by reserve requirements in Brazil, this paper follows the recent trend of the 
international literature that investigates the incidence of reserve requirements by 
employing event study methods to the Brazilian case. What we do in the paper is test 
whether banks’ shareholders bear part of the burden of reserve requirements in Brazil, 
and, likewise, benefit from reductions in required reserve ratios or calculation base. We 
also investigate whether the response of stock returns of Brazilian banks is in any 
manner different from stock returns of the non-financial sector.  
                                                 
1 Every year, the Central Bank of Brazil publishes a report on the evolution, determinants, and future 
prospects of banking spreads in Brazil (www.bcb.gov.br). In Juros e Spread Bancário: Avaliação do   6 
Reserve requirements in Brazil equal more than a quarter of their respective 
deposits and the regulation on reserve requirements is also very cumbersome. Tax 
ratios, interest accrued on reserves, form of compliance (cash, securities or vault cash), 
and authorized deductions from the reservable base all differ across types of banks’ 
liabilities and assets, and have changed remarkably often over the past 12 years. 
The Brazilian sample is also very challenging. In addition to a reduced number 
of companies listed in the stock market compared to the US, the impressive number of 
changes in reserve requirement regulation during these past 12 years makes the work of 
any econometrician very hard, and using data prior to the Real Plan poses another 
challenge to empirical investigations because of the distortions caused by 
hyperinflation. A careful sample selection provided us with three events of changes in 
reserve requirements on transactions accounts and four events of changes in 
requirements on time deposits. It is not an easy task to reach an agreement on whether 
the net effect of some changes was a reduction or an increase in the tax burden. The last 
event of change in reserve requirements on transaction accounts that is analyzed here, 
for instance, refers both to an increase in the reserve requirement ratio and to an 
increase in authorized deductions on the taxable base, the latter functioning as a 
reduction in the ratio. Because of this difficulty in determining whether a change in 
reserve requirement would be perceived as positive, neutral or negative for 
stockholders, we decided to analyze each event separately and try to draw general 
conclusions from the individual results we were able to achieve.  
The results were sensitive to alternative test methodologies employed. Under 
reasonable assumptions, we find evidence that some changes in reserve requirements on 
time and transaction accounts had important effects on the stock returns of the banking 
system. Non-financial corporations were most likely affected only by decisions on 
reserve requirements on time deposits. These results suggest that the tax implied by 
reserve requirements in Brazil is shared amongst banks’ clients and owners, and it is 
sometimes born by owners alone. Thus, the widespread perception that reserve 
requirements on time deposits imply zero costs to banks and that reserve requirements 
on transaction accounts are always an efficient instrument of monetary policy cannot 
find much support on the results obtained here. 
                                                                                                                                               
Segundo Ano do Projeto, pp. 51, the Central Bank of Brazil assumes that the tax burden of time deposits 
is zero because their reserves at the central bank accrue the overnight reference interest rate.   7 
The paper is presented in the following sequence. Section 2 provides some 
stylized facts on reserve requirements in Brazil. Section 3 draws some lines on event 
study methods employed in this paper to test for abnormal returns. Section 4 describes 
the sample. Section 5 reports the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
1.  Reserve Requirements in Brazil
2  
Fernandes (1992) reports that reserve requirements in Brazil were first 
introduced in 1932. By then the central bank had not yet been created, and the monetary 
authority operations were carried out by Banco do Brasil, a state-owned commercial 
cum development bank.  
Throughout the entire history of reserve requirement regulation in Brazil, 
concerns other than those attached strictly to monetary policy permeated reserve 
requirement decisions. Cardoso (2003, p.p. 8) argues that until 1993, reserve 
requirements were mainly implemented to (imperfectly) tax banks profits that accrued 
with high inflation rates. Fernandes (1992) suggests that other fiscal issues have also 
been determinant to reserve requirement decisions. 
In 1945, as an attempt to part the monetary authority from Banco do Brasil, the 
agency Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito (SUMOC) was created to control 
money market operations and to set the grounds for a Brazilian central bank. One of the 
measures SUMOC implemented was to introduce interest-bearing required reserves, 
partly complied with required investment in public bonds. It was then that the Brazilian 
monetary authority started to use reserve requirements to sustain an artificial demand 
for public securities, a policy that still prevails nowadays (Figure 3).  
SUMOC was not operationally independent from Banco do Brasil, as 
commercial banks were required to hold their reserves at the federal commercial bank. 
As a result, reserve requirements also functioned as an alternative funding for Banco do 
Brasil to implement credit operations on behalf of the central government. 
Upon inflationary concerns, the Central Bank of Brazil was created in 1964. 
Since then reserve requirement regulation has been successively altered in accordance 
with prevailing economic policy purposes. In 1986, federal government deposits were 
finally transferred to the Central Bank of Brazil, with the central bank not allowed to 
                                                 
2 This section is strongly based on Fernandes (1992) and Cardoso (2003)   8 
finance National Treasury’s overdraft positions. Therefore, central bank’s autonomy 
enhanced.  
Until 1993, reserve requirements were used for distributional purposes, with 
required ratios being higher for bank branches located in richer regions of the country 
(Table 2)
3. Required ratios on transaction accounts increased over time. For non-poor 
regions, the ratios were 27% from 1969 to 1975, 33% and 35% in 1976, and 40% from 
1977 to 1993. In spite of a long-lasting period of hyperinflation in Brazil, reserve 
requirements were not a focal instrument of monetary policy during this period
4. 
In 1994, the perverse inflationary dynamics finally came to a halt with the 
successful implementation of the Real Plan. Along with a monetary reform also came a 
brief fiscal adjustment, the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, and tight 
monetary policy
5 
6. From 1994 until the end of 1998, the Central Bank of Brazil adopted 
rediscount rates as its main monetary policy instrument, but kept very close attention to 
monetary aggregates.  
As a result, reserve requirements were intensely used for monetary policy 
purposes during the Real Plan. In mid-1994, the central bank increased required ratios 
on transaction accounts to 100% (from 40%), on savings accounts to 20% (from 15%), 
and on time deposits to 20% (from 0%). In the 18 months following June 1994, there 
were 53 changes of all sorts in the reserve requirement regulation. In this specific 
period, the central bank, attempting to curb the ability of banks to innovate on their 
funding and thus to bypass reserve requirements, created new requirements on a number 
of banks’ assets and liabilities
7, in addition to the already existing requirements on 
investment funds, savings accounts, transaction accounts, judicial deposits and deposits 
from realized guarantees (recursos de depósitos e garantias realizadas). 
Even when monetary policy purposes prevailed in reserve requirement 
decisions, fiscal issues were still important. The high level of domestic real interest rates 
                                                 
3 Between 1969 and 1993, the required ratio on demand deposits was 18% for the poorest states (Acre, 
Amazonas, Pará, Maranhão, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia, 
Espírito Santo, Goiás, and Mato Grosso) and 27% for the remaining regions. 
4 Cardoso (2003). Required ratios on time deposits were in place only in part of the 1984-1985 period.  
5 Cardoso (2003), p.p. 5 
6 The Real Plan, which began in July 1994, put an end on decades of hyperinflation in Brazil. Its main 
anchor was a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate regime changed in 1999 to a dirty floating of the 
currency, followed by an inflation targeting regime that has maintained price stability. 
7 The accounts that started to be subject to reserve requirements were “contratos de assunção de 
obrigações”, credit operations (operações de adiantamento, empréstimos, financiamento e de crédito), 
“operações ativas e passivas”, and time deposits at indetermined tenure (depósitos a prazo de reaplicação 
automática).   9 
and the sharp appreciation of the Real during the 1994-1998 period resulted in increased 
external borrowing. External inflows were partly sterilized to avoid pressure on 
domestic liquidity and interest rates. These countervailing measures, associated with 
high debt servicing rates, exerted strong pressure on the fiscal accounts. In 1998, a year 
of intense capital flight and increased difficulties to roll over the domestic debt, reserve 
requirements were overtly used to sustain an artificial demand for public securities. 
The international confidence crisis of 1997 and 1998 and increased concerns 
about debt sustainability led to strong capital outflows, culminating in the floating of the 
exchange rate in January 1999. A new policy framework was then envisaged to keep 
inflation under control without further compromising the fiscal accounts. In May 1999, 
the central bank abandoned the use of rediscount rates as its operational target to focus 
on overnight interest rates. In June 1999, the country formally adopted an inflation-
targeting regime, in which reserve requirements lost some of their importance as a 
monetary policy instrument.  
However, fiscal concerns have still played a role in reserve requirement 
decisions, even under an inflation targeting regime. Upon the implementation of the 
new monetary policy regime, the central bank committed itself to gradually reduce 
reserve requirement ratios “as long as good fiscal results continue and inflation is under 
control”
8. However, the easing path of reserve requirements on transaction accounts did 
not last long. In 2002, the central bank inaugurated an additional requirement: interest-
bearing reserve requirements on transaction accounts and time deposits and savings 
accounts. The purpose was to reduce some of the pressure on the liquidity that was freed 
to the market because of an innovation in instruments used to rollover domestic debt 
indexed to foreign-currency
9. The liquidity freed to the market had to be channeled out 
to daily repo operations with the central bank or the pressure would be too strong on 
interest rates and thus on inflation. This placed the central bank at a very uncomfortable 
position of rolling over high amounts of very short-term debt. In 2002, this excess 
liquidity reached R$ 70 billion and as of November 2006 (date for the last revision in 
this paper) stood at R$ 80 billion, of which 28% was withdrawn with very short-term 
repo operations and 47% with repos redeeming in 5 months. 
                                                 
8 Juros e Spread Bancário, primeiro ano. 
9 As an attempt to improve on the supply of financial hedge to the volatility of the exchange rate, and 
because of constraints on the issuance of domestic-debt indexed to foreign currencies, the government 
decided to rollover maturing domestic-debt indexed to foreign currencies using derivatives, which had 
minor monetary impact.   10 
In February 2003, the required ratio on transaction accounts increased as part of 
a set of measures to control accelerating inflation. In this event, the Monetary Policy 
Committee made it explicit that the central bank was changing reserve requirements for 
monetary policy purposes. After inflationary pressures dissipated, reserve requirement 
ratios were reduced. 
 
1.1. A brief international comparison 
  García (1995) reports that, contrary to Brazil, advanced economies have 
followed a reducing trend in reserve requirements over time. This trend has arisen from 
the widespread adoption of interest rates, rather than monetary aggregates, as the main 
instrument of monetary policy. 
In Brazil, even after the explicit adoption of interest rates as the main monetary 
policy instrument, and despite the fact that reserve requirements have not been used as 
policy instruments since 2003, their phasing out has been hindered by the entanglements 
of fiscal and monetary policy. For one thing, the banking credit market is still not deep 
enough to absorb the liquidity that would be freed to the market should required 
reserves be strongly reduced. In addition, as of September 2007, around 23% of total 
reserve requirements were complied with mandatory investment in public securities 
(Figure 3), which guarantees an artificial demand of R$ 44 billion for government debt, 
or 4% of federal government bonds in the market. 
In September 2007, the requirements that remained in Brazil were on 
transactions accounts (40% in cash-in-vault plus 5% in non-interest bearing reserves at 
the central bank plus 8% interest-bearing reserves at the central bank), time deposits 
(15% in the form of mandatory investment in public securities plus 8% in interest-
bearing reserves at the central bank), and savings accounts (30% in the form of both 
mandatory investment in public securities and interest-bearing reserves at the central 
bank plus 65% in required concession of loans) (Figure 4 and Table 3). These ratios are 
still significantly high under international comparisons (Figure 5). 
The share of required reserves on transaction accounts that accrue interest yield 
the Selic rate (reference overnight rate), and so do required reserves on time deposits 
and additional reserves on savings accounts). At end-2006, interest paid to required 
reserves on savings accounts (excluding the additional requirement that yields the Selic 
rate) was 6.7% p.y plus Taxa Referencial (TR, another base rate set by the Central   11 
Bank) for some types of savings accounts (poupança livre, pecúlio and rural) and TR 
plus 3% p.y. for the other type (poupança vinculada). 
Compared to the US, reserve requirements in Brazil bring about an additional 
difficulty to depository institutions: the relatively high frequency of changes in the 
regulation. A quick search on Banco Central do Brasil’s website for reserve requirement 
regulation from January 2004 to December 2006 returns a record of a dozen changes of 
all sorts – although not all of them meant increases in requirements. For the past twenty 
years in Brazil, the number of changes in reserve ratios, calculation and maintenance 
periods, exemption base, required daily balances as a share of total requirement, and 
reporting procedures has been substantial. In the US, the most frequent changes usually 
occur once a year, and refer to the bounds on the volume of net transaction accounts 
over which distinct reserve ratios apply. Nonetheless, market is not caught by surprise 
upon these changes, as the yearly changes were envisaged by the Monetary Control Act 
of 1980 and the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982. For requirements other than net 
transaction accounts, no changes have occurred for the past 16 years. 
One could argue that the reason why there have been so many changes in reserve 
requirement regulation in Brazil is that financial innovations in Brazil are more 
frequent, as the market is in a less mature state. However, of the 12 changes in the 
regulation over the 2 years ending in 2006, only 2 of them comprised changes to the list 
of liabilities included in the reservable base.  
Table 4 compares reserve requirement regulation on transactions accounts in the 
US and in Brazil, as of December 2006. There were important differences not only 
regarding the ratios, but also the form of compliance, calculation and maintenance 
periods, and minimum required daily balances. 
 
2.  Event Study  
Most of the literature that tests the impact of changes in reserve requirements on 
stock returns has employed the one-factor model derived from CAPM
10. Quoting Brown 
and Warner (1980), the abnormal return for a given security in any time t is defined as 
the difference between its actual ex post return and that which is predicted under the 
assumed return-generating process
11:  
                                                 
10 Brown and Warner (1980) show that multi-factor models or more complicated risk adjustment models 
do not yield significant improvements in assessing abnormal returns compared to the one-factor model. 
11 Brown and Warner (1980), pp. 207.   12 
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1 ˆ ˆ β α   (2) 
where 
= it AR portfolio i’s abnormal return at time t 
= it R portfolio i’s return at time t 
t MKT = benchmark market return at time t 
( ) i i β α ˆ ˆ = vector of parameters of the market model estimated for portfolio i using data 
from the estimation period 
What varies significantly in the literature is the way the parameters  i α ˆ  and  i β ˆ  are 
estimated. Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1990), and Cosimano and McDonald (1998) 
add dummies to the model to capture abnormal returns on the day of the change in 
reserve requirements (t = 0), and on the previous day (t = -1), the latter also test for 
eventual leaks in policymakers’ intentions. They estimate the parameters through 
pooled cross section time series regressions, using ordinary least squares errors in the 
hypothesis tests.  
Osborne and Zaher (1992), nonetheless, argue that models using dummies have 
the drawback of not being able to identify the size of abnormal returns relative to the 
size of the tax change. To overcome this problem, they employ the event-study method, 
which is widely used in the finance and accounting literature to identify the impact of 
certain events on stock returns, and which is also employed here. 
Many authors criticize the use of OLS errors to test the hypothesis of abnormal 
returns when events are clustered in calendar time, as is the case in this paper. With 
clustering of events, the errors estimated through OLS will present cross-sectional 
dependence and probably heteroscedasticity, and will thus jeopardize hypothesis tests if 
additional techniques are not introduced in the estimation. Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985) suggest that aggregate measures of stock performance be used instead of 
individual portfolio returns to overcome the problem of cross-sectional correlation.  
Our null hypothesis is of no abnormal returns over the event period (the period 
when the event may be affecting stock returns). To test the null we employed two 
alternative test procedures, based on Dann and James (1982) and Dodd and Warner   13 
(1983). To apply Dann and James’ T-test statistics, we averaged the stock returns of 
companies listed in Bovespa, the most important Brazilian stock exchange, over two 
groups: financial and non-financial, weighing each company’s return by its daily 
financial volume of transactions. We then ran OLS on each of the two groups of 
companies over the estimation period (when the event was likely not affecting the return 
generating process) to obtain the parameters in (2). We would then identify the size of 
the abnormal return in (1) by comparing the result we obtained in (2) with the actual 
average stock returns in each group over the event period.  
The T-statistic for each day in the event window is defined as: 






















































p = industry (in this study financial or non-financial) 
p L  = number of days in the estimation period 
2
p S =  variance of the market-model residuals for industry p (calculated over the 
estimation period)  
t MKT  = return of the benchmark portfolio at time t in the event window 
τ MKT = return of the benchmark portfolio at timeτ  in the estimation period 
MKT  = average return of the benchmark portfolio over the estimation period 
 
As cross-section correlation and heteroscedasticity were properly treated, market 
model residuals are independent and identically distributed. Therefore, the T-statistic is 
distributed as two-tailed Student-t with ( p L -2) degrees of freedom.  
To test for the significance of cumulative abnormal returns over a sub-period (I) 
of the event window, or even over the entire event window itself (A), the first method 




































T   (4) 
where 
n = number of days in the impact period (I), defined as a sub-period within the event 
window 
N = number of days in the even window 
AR = average abnormal return calculated over the subset of the event window that does 
not include the impact period 
  Under the null of no abnormal returns, the  2 T  statistics is distributed as a two-
tailed t-Student with N-n-1 degrees of freedom. 
  The alternative method to the  2 T  statistics used in this study is Dodd and Warner 
(1983)’s Z-statistics. For each firm i, we calculate the standardized abnormal return: 































































,   (6) 
and finally obtain the equally weighted Z-test statistics for each industry p: 













and  p k is the number of firms in industry p. Under the null of no abnormal standardized 
returns, Z is distributed as a standard normal. 
3.  The Sample and the Events  
The sample consisted of ordinary (voting) shares negotiated at Bovespa. The 
series was obtained from Economatica
®, and was adjusted for dividends, splits, and   15 
grouping. However, following Mandelker (1974), Watts (1978), Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), and Osborne and Zaher (1992), we removed from our sample those companies 
that distributed or announced dividends, stock dividends, capital gains, splits, grouping, 
new stock offers, unresolved ownership disputes, mergers, buyouts, and acquisitions 
during the estimation period and event window. There is a problem that remains when 
this procedure is implemented, and to our knowledge it is not explicitly addressed in the 
literature investigated
12. The benchmark market index does not exclude companies that 
may be under the effect of such events. Thus, in some occasions their abnormal returns 
may influence the test-result and imply that the industry analyzed is showing abnormal 
returns when in fact it is the market index that is abnormal. Such an issue seemed to 
play a role in one of the events analyzed below. We shall address it then. 
Mergers and acquisitions were a serious problem in the Brazilian sample. During 
the entire period analyzed in this paper, financial institutions went through significant 
changes in ownership, not only due to the privatization program of state and federal 
banks, but also due to a fierce competition for higher stakes of the domestic market. In 
the non-financial sector many industries also went through similar processes of 
ownership transfers, but to a lesser extent.  
Seven events of reserve requirement changes were analyzed. As shown in Table 
5, events 1 to 4 refer to changes in reserve requirements on time deposits, and the three 
remaining events refer to changes in reserve requirements on transaction accounts. 
Table 5 also shows the non-event (estimation) period used for each event.  
The estimation period selected for each event was the largest possible, given the 
number of changes in reserve requirements that occurred during the analyzed period. 
The selected events had their estimation window free of any possible influence from 
other reserve requirement changes. This is the reason why we selected so few events, 
compared to the universe of reserve requirement changes that have occurred since 1994. 
  For events 1 and 3, the estimation period spans a period prior to the event 
window. For events 4 to 7, we used a post-event estimation period because the period 
before the event had important economic announcements that could adversely impact 
the estimation of the market model. Distinctly from the other events, the estimation 
period of the second event was split in two. The number of days that could be used for 
the estimation period either before or after the event window was too small to allow for 
                                                 
12 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention.   16 
reasonable econometric inference. To prevent the event dynamics from having any 
impact on the estimation period, we left a span of 7 working days (12 week days) 
between the end of the event window and the beginning of that subset of the estimation 
window. The use of pre- and post-event estimation periods is not an innovation here 
(see e.g. Osborne and Zaher (1992)). Under the assumption that the event will only 
affect the stock return dynamics in the event period, the econometrician can choose pre-
event, post-event or a mix of both for the estimation period. 
For daily T-tests and the Z-tests, the event window tested here consisted of 6 
business days (D-2 to D+3). D0 was either the announcement date, when it was made 
with the markets still open, or the business day that immediately followed the 
announcement, when it was made after markets had closed. For more robustness in the 
analysis, we let the event window be comprised of either 6 or 11 business days for 
cumulative T-tests. Specifically for event 4, the event window tested consisted of either 
6 or 8 business days.  
The choice of the length of the event period is ad-hoc in the literature. In the 
literature that employs event-methods to detect abnormal returns from changes in 
reserve requirements in the US, for instance, Dann and James (1982) and Kolari et al 
(1988) use a 26-business day event period whereas Osborne and Zaher (1992) use an 
11-day window. A rule of thumb is that the event period should not be too short to let 
out eventual price corrections or too lengthy to be contaminated by normal price 
dynamics or other innovation. A lengthy period would be more problematic in the 
Brazilian case because of the high frequency of news that impact stock returns in the 
country, both at a macro level, affecting all listed companies alike, and at more micro 
levels, affecting only a subgroup of listed companies. 
There are two representative benchmark rates that can be used in Brazil: 
Ibovespa and IbrX. Both are traded in Bovespa, the main stock exchange in Brazil, but 
significantly differ as to their calculation methodologies. Ibovespa’s theoretical 
portfolio dates of 1968 and accounts for around 80% of the amount and financial 
volume traded in the spot market. IbrX, on the other hand, comprises the 100 stocks 
with the greatest number of negotiations and financial volume traded. 
 
4.  The Results 
Table 6 shows the results of the market model estimation and the tests for 
abnormal returns using Dann and James (1982)’s T-tests and Dodd and Warner (1983)’s   17 
Z-test. As the market model estimations using IBrX had a better performance, we chose 
to test for abnormal returns using the IBrX as the proxy for the market return.  
For each event we tested the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns in the event 
period. We will first analyze each event separately and then draw general conclusions. 
In event 1, the central bank changed the regulation on reserve requirements on 
time deposits by requiring banks to comply with the requirement by investing in federal 
securities. The regulation that was previously in place required banks to deposit reserves 
at the central bank, accruing TBC interest rate, which was lower than the rates accrued 
to federal securities. Thus, this change in reserve requirement regulation would be 
expected to cause net positive abnormal returns to the banking industry and/or to the 
non-financial system over the event window. However, two days prior to the 
announcement, there were significant negative abnormal returns in banks’ stocks. On 
that specific day, there is no evidence in the newswires of any false rumor about a 
change in reserve requirements. Thus, negative abnormal returns in the banking industry 
are likely to have occurred because of a temporary overreaction of the benchmark 
market return stemming from a previous successful auctioning of a domestic energy 
generation firm (Gerasul).  
The tests for cumulative abnormal returns over the entire event period are 
sensitive to the methodology employed. Using Dann and James (1982)’s two-tailed T-
test statistics, we found no evidence of cumulative abnormal returns in the stocks of the 
financial or non-financial system. Notwithstanding, Dodd and Warner (1983)’s Z-test 
points to significant cumulative negative abnormal returns to the banking industry even 
at the 99% confidence level. There is an important methodological difference between 
these two test alternatives. Whilst the T-test for cumulative abnormal returns uses a 
stock return series that is weighted by the daily traded financial volume, the Z-test is 
equally weighted. Therefore, significant abnormal returns of stocks that are less liquid 
will be attributed greater importance by the Z-test than by the T-test. 
The Z-test result for the banking industry is probably capturing not only the 
exaggeration in the benchmark market index on the first day of the event period but also 
a negative reaction on the last day caused by some news that Standard and Poor’s had 
lowered the outlook for the external debt of the country and of 3 privately owned banks 
amongst which was Unibanco, included in the sample analyzed in the event.  
The T-test, on the other hand, is highly influenced by the neutrality of the event 
in the stock returns of Banco do Brasil, the bank by far with the highest financial   18 
volume traded over the event. This neutrality is ambiguous, though. One could reason 
that if it had not been for the positive news about the reserve requirements, the turmoil 
surrounding the domestic economy (e.g. capital flight, increased interest rates, debt 
downgrading) would have caused important negative abnormal returns to the stocks of 
Banco do Brasil. As we do not know of a way to solve this issue, we take the more 
conservative stance of interpreting the results as suggesting that this change in reserve 
requirement regulation was neutral to the banking industry. 
In the non-financial system, the Z-test indicates significant cumulative positive 
abnormal returns. The presence of stocks of non-financial firms (albeit not the most 
liquid ones) being positively affected by this change in required reserves on time 
deposits can thus suggest that the change was interpreted as a relief of the tax burden 
imposed to the non-financial system.  
In events 2, 3 and 4, the central bank reduced the ratios of reserve requirements 
on time deposits. Although the absolute reduction was most pronounced in the last 
events, abnormal returns in the financial system were only observed in event 2. The T-
tests for daily abnormal returns indicate positive abnormal returns in bank stocks on the 
day prior to the announcement and on the three days following the announcement. The 
Z-test result for cumulative abnormal returns in the banking industry is also in line with 
the daily T-tests, and suggests a significant positive abnormal return to bank 
shareholders in the event period.  
The evidence of abnormal returns to the banking industry only in event 2 
suggests that banks’ shareholders may have anticipated the future downward trajectory 
of required ratios, as the central bank had previously announced that reduction of 
reserve requirements was a medium term goal.  
That may also have been the case for the non-financial system. Although daily 
and cumulative T-tests do not support the evidence of abnormal returns in event 2, the 
Z-test rejects the null hypothesis at the 99% confidence level. Once again, the difference 
in the test results stems from the distinct weighting methodology of each test.  
We should thus interpret these results as supporting the evidence that for 
corporate stocks that are not highly liquid, reserve requirements on time deposits are a 
tax shared amongst banks’ clients and owners. These conclusions contrast with those in 
Cardoso and Koyama (1999). Our view is that, in spite of yielding market returns on 
securities, the fact that reserve requirements on time deposits require banks to allocate 
their portfolio in a certain class of investment may be in itself distortional. It may also   19 
be misleading to assume that these types of reserve requirements do not impose any 
kind of burden to the real sector.  
We now turn to changes in reserve requirements on transaction accounts. Event 
5, which reduced the required ratio by 10 bps, had a neutral effect on the stock returns 
of the non-financial system. This evidence holds for both T- and Z- tests. On the other 
hand, although daily T-tests and the cumulative Z-test did not point to significant 
abnormal bank stock returns, cumulative T-tests strongly reject the null for both the sub-
period following the announcement and for the entire event period. We thus interpret 
these results as suggesting that banks whose stocks were highly traded during the event 
period were significantly more impacted by these changes in reserve requirements than 
those with low negotiation volumes. Under this reasoning, required reserves on 
transaction accounts would be interpreted as a tax born upon banks’ shareholders, and 
not clients. 
Event 6, which exempted one liability account from the taxable base, had a 
significant impact on bank stock returns two days prior to the announcement. However, 
this impact was offset throughout the event period, and both cumulative T- and Z-tests 
could not reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal return. 
The daily and cumulative T-tests do not indicate presence of abnormal returns in 
the non-financial sector. On the other hand, the Z-test points to counter-intuitive 
negative cumulative abnormal returns in the event period (at a 90% confidence level). 
Traded volume in the stock exchange was very low over the event period due to 
uncertainty stemming from the international environment and negative news from major 
foreign stock exchanges. We thus take the conservative stance of accepting the results 
of the T-tests as indicative that this change in the reserve requirement regulation had a 
neutral impact on both the banking and the non-banking industry. 
In event 7, the central bank increased the reserve requirement ratio and also 
increased deductions from the taxable base. Contrary to the events analyzed above, this 
change was justified purely as a monetary policy decision. However, the event was 
contaminated by a concomitant central bank’s decision to increase basic interest rates. 
Although we cannot conclude that evidence of abnormal returns during this event would 
be solely or even partially due to the change in reserve requirements, it should be 
interesting to check whether the use of two instruments together to further restrict 
monetary conditions would cause negative abnormal returns in the stocks of the non-
financial sector.    20 
In the non-financial sector, the event induced negative abnormal returns on the 
day following the announcement. Cumulative T-tests also point to negative abnormal 
returns over the sub-period after the announcement and over the entire event period. 
However, and surprisingly, the Z-test points to positive abnormal returns over the event 
period. In this particular event, we find that the T-tests are to be more trusted than the Z-
test for the non-banking sector. On the second day of the event, a particular firm stock 
(Telebras Remanescente ON) posted a 100% daily return, partially offset the following 
day, but with negligible traded volume. 
On the other hand, the Z-test for the banking industry points to negative 
abnormal returns over the event period, whereas the daily and cumulative T-tests 
present no evidence of abnormal returns. This time, the banks more severely affected by 
the event were the ones whose stocks had lower financial negotiation.  
Looking at these results, we conclude that reserve requirements on transaction 
accounts in Brazil were not a tax born exclusively by banks’ clients. From the events 
that were not contaminated by concomitant monetary policy decision, we further infer 
that they are a tax born solely by banks’ shareholders, and thus not operative for the 
credit channel of monetary policy. This latter conclusion should be taken with caution, 
as it is derived from two events only. We advise that in the future more events be 
analyzed to draw more robust conclusions.  
Our findings are in line with most papers that investigate the incidence of 
reserve requirements using event-study methods. Kolari, Mahajan and Saunders (1998), 
Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1990), Osborne and Zaher (1992), Cosimano and 
McDonald (1998), and Hein and Stewart (2002, 2003) all find that reserve requirements 
are a tax shared by banks’ shareholders and clients in the US. Slovin, Sushka and 
Bendeck go on further to argue that in this case they are not an efficient instrument of 
monetary policy.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we tested the hypothesis of shared incidence of reserve 
requirements in Brazil. By employing an event-study method, we investigated whether 
changes in reserve requirements on transaction accounts and time deposits caused 
abnormal stock returns in the financial and non-financial sector of the economy. 
The results obtained are sensitive to the test procedure adopted, implying that the 
conclusions should be taken with caution. What is reported below is based on a   21 
discretionary choice by the authors of taking a more conservative stance upon choosing 
among conflicting test results. 
Some results from the aggregate portfolio model oppose the assumption that 
interest bearing required reserves on time deposits are not distortional. In one of the 
events investigated, there is evidence that a reduction in required ratios caused positive 
abnormal returns to the banking industry. The results also oppose the assumption that 
reserve requirements on time deposits are neutral to non-financial corporations. In spite 
of yielding market returns on securities, the fact that reserve requirements on time 
deposits require banks to allocate their portfolio in a certain class of investment may be 
in itself distortional. It may also be misleading to assume that these types of reserve 
requirements do not impose any kind of burden to the real sector. In two events 
investigated, stock returns of the non-financial system were positively impacted by 
announcements that the required ratio would reduce or interest accrued on the required 
reserves would increase to market rates.  
Some authors (e.g. Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck, 1990) advocate that when 
reserve requirements affect stock returns of non-financial corporations, then reserve 
requirements are a non-neutral instrument of monetary policy. However, when fiscal 
concerns drive reserve requirement decisions, as has been the case on a number of 
occasions in Brazil, we could extend this argument to state that reserve requirements are 
a non-neutral instrument of fiscal policy when stock returns of non-financial firms are 
affected by these requirements. 
Of the two events that were most likely not contaminated by concomitant 
decisions on basic interest rates, changes in reserve requirements on transaction 
accounts were neutral to the non-financial sector, implying that if reserve requirements 
on transaction accounts were being used to affect the credit channel of monetary policy, 
they were inefficient. In one of these events, the banking industry seems to have 
benefited from the change, thus suggesting that the tax implied by these required 
reserves was most likely born by banks’ shareholders. 
Importantly, as banks’ shareholders bear part or (as the events analyzed here 
suggest) the bulk of the burden of reserve requirements, reductions in their ratios are 
likely to be of limited impact in bank spreads. In this respect, this paper adds support to 
the work of Nakane and Koyama (2001a,b) and Afanasieff, Lhacer and Nakane (2002), 
where the authors find no significant relation between reserve requirements and bank 
spreads on bank loans in Brazil.   22 
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Appendix A – Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Potential revenue from interest accrued on monthly reserve deposits at 
the Central Bank of Brazil (R$ million) 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil (www.bcb.gov.br) 
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Figure 2 – Potential revenue from interest accrued on monthly reserve deposits at 
















































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil (www.bcb.gov.br) 
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Compliance with public securities Interest accruing Non-interest accruing
 
 Source: Central Bank of Brazil (www.bcb.gov.br) 
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short-term 30 days 60 days
 
* These figures only illustrate the time evolution of ratios on reserve requirements that are still in place in Brazil as 
of September 2007. The ratios represented here are the sum of all ratios that apply to a certain reservable base 
(standard + additional). The deductible base for each type of ratio is different and is not shown here. 
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Figure 5 – Ratios of Reserve Requirement on Transaction Accounts in Selected 
Emerging Markets and Developed Countries (As of 2004) 
  
(1)   Ratio on demand deposits in foreign currency 
(2)   Ratio on demand deposits in Turkish Lira 
(3)   Ratio on demand deposits below US$ 6.6 million 
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Appendix B – Tables 
 
Table 1 – Financial Cost of Reserve Requirements on Transaction Accounts (% p.y.) 
Interest Accrued on Reserve 
Requirements (Excludes non-
interest bearing bank reserves 
on transaction accounts)





Dec-00 7.36 3.60 16.19
Dec-01 8.13 4.26 19.05
Dec-02 10.82 7.48 23.03
Dec-03 8.42 6.02 16.91
Dec-04 8.98 6.32 17.50
Dec-05 8.98 6.22 18.24
Dec-06 8.01 5.56 13.19
Sep-07 6.52 4.68 11.22  
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Table 2 – Reserve Requirements in Brazil: Pre-Stabilization Period (1969 – 1993)  
(% of deposits) 
  Demand Deposits
1/  Time Deposits 
   Region  A 
2/ Region  B 
2/ Region  A 
2/ Region  B 
2/ 
Apr-69     27  18  9  4.5 
May-71 
3/  27 18 9 4 
Jan-73      27 18 0 0 
Mar-73 
4/  27 18 0 0 
Jul-73 
5/  27 18 0 0 
Jul-74 
6/  27 18 0 0 
Feb-75 
7/  27 18 0 0 
Jul-75 
8/  27 18 0 0 
Apr-76      33 18 0 0 
Jul-76      35 18 0 0 
Oct-77      40 18 0 0 
Jul-79 
9/  40 18 0 0 
Dec-84     40  18  22  22 
Jun-85     40  18  20  20 
Jan-92      40 18 0 0 
Nov-93      40 40 0 0 
1/ The periods and formula for calculating average deposits on which required reserves were to be 
based changed many times between 1969 and 1993. 
2/ Region B: Acre, Amazonas, Pará, Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, 
Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Mato Grosso. 
Region A: all other states. 
3/ A reduction of half percentage point in required reserves will make up resources from demand 
deposits destined to loans to small and medium enterprises. 
4/ A reduction of 2 percentage points in required reserves rates will make up resources from 
demand deposits to be destined to loans to exporters. 
5/ Percentage of demand deposits destined for rural credit increased from 10% to 15%. 
6/ Amount to be destined to loans to small and medium enterprises increases to 4% of demand 
deposits. 
7/ Mandatory loans for working capital of small and medium enterprises increases to 8% of 
demand deposits. 
8/ 55% of required reserves to be held in government bonds (LTN or ORTN). 
9/ Percentage of demand deposits destined for rural credit increased from 15% to 17%. 
Source: Cardoso (2003) 31 
Table 3 – Changes in Reserve Requirement Ratios in Brazil After the Real Plan 
  Demand    Time  Savings  Loan  Money Market Funds    Additional Reserves  Period 
 (months in which required 
ratios changed) 
 
 Deposits   Deposits  Accounts  Operations  Short Term  30 days  60 days    Demand 
Deposits 
Time Deposits  Savings 
Accounts 
Before the Real Plan  50%
 1/  0% 15%  0%  0%  0%  0%    0%  0%  0% 
Jul/94    100% 
1/ 
(1) 
20% 20%                 
Aug/94     
1/ 30%  30%                
Oct/94     
1/     15%               
Dez/94    90% 
1/ 27%                  
Apr/95     
1/ 30%                  
May/95     
1/     12%               
Jun/95     
1/     10%               
Jul/95    83%            35%  10%  5%         
Aug/95       20%  15%  8%  40%  5%  0%         
Sep/95           5%               
Nov/95           0%               
Aug/96    82%         42%             
Sep/96    81%         44%             
Oct/96    80%         46%             
Nov/96    79%         48%             
Dez/96    78%         50%             
Jan/97    75%                      
Dec-98                          
Mar/99       30%                   
May/99       25%                   
Jul/99       20%                   
Aug/99             0%  0%           
Sep-99       10%                   
Oct-99    65%   0%                   
Mar/2000    55%                      
Jun/2000    45%                      
Sep/2001       10%                   
Jun/2002       15%                   
Jul/2002         20%                 
Aug/2002                     3%  3%  5% 
Oct/2002                     8%  8%  10% 
Feb/2003    60%                      
Aug/2003    45%                                 
1/ In addition to this required ratio on the current collectable base, a 100% ratio was applicable over the increase of collectable base after a pre-determined period 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil (www.bcb.gov.br)   32 
Table 4 – Regulation on Reserve Requirements on Transaction Accounts in the US 
and in Brazil, as of December 2006 
 
 USA  Brazil 
Ratios
1/ 
US$ 0 – US$ 7.8 million: 0% 
US$ 7.8 million – US$ 48.3 million: 3% 
More than US$ 48.3 million: 10% 
R$ 0 – R$ 44 million: 0% 
More than R$ 44 million: 45%  
 
Exemptions  Institutions with a daily average of net 
transactions accounts below US$ 7.8 billion 
1.  Institutions with a daily average of reservable deposits 
below R$ 44,000,010 thousand 
2.  Deposits from payment orders in foreign currencies 
3.  Demand, prior notice and investment deposits of 
government, autarchies and government-controlled 
institutions with their respective federal and state-controlled 
banks 
4.  Demand, prior notice and investment deposits of city 
governments with their respective state-controlled banks  
Deductions  N/A  R$ 44 million from total reservable deposits 
Share of Vault 
Cash 
At the discretion of the depository institution, up 
to the amount of the reserve requirement, 
provided that reserve balances at the FRB are 
non-negative 
Up to 40% of the reservable base 
Reservable 
Accounts 
1. Demand Deposits 
2. Automatic transfer service accounts 
3. NOW accounts 
4. Share draft accounts 
5. Telephone or preauthorized transfer accounts 
6. Ineligible acceptances 
7. Obligations issued by affiliates maturing in 7 
days or less 
1.  Demand Deposits 
2.  Prior notice deposits 
3.  Share draft accounts 
4.  Deposits from tax levied 
5.  Business cheques 
6.  Deposits from services supplied 
7.  Deposits from realized guaranties 
8.  Investment deposits 
9.  Contratos de Assunção de Obrigações Vinculados a 
Operações Realizadas no País  
Total Required 
Reserves  US$ 41.05 billion (as of August 2006)   
Depository 
Institutions  
Commercial banks, savings banks and loan 
associations, credit unions, US branches and 
agencies of foreign banks, Edge act corporations, 
and agreement corporations 
Universal banks with a commercial portfolio, commercial banks, 
investment banks, savings banks 
Calculation Period 
For institutions that file reports on a weekly 
basis: 2 weeks 
For institutions that submit reports on a quarterly 
basis




For institutions that file reports on a weekly 
basis: 2 weeks, beginning 17 days after the end of 
the associated calculation period 
For institutions that submit reports on a quarterly 
basis: 13 consecutive 1-week periods, beginning 
24 days after the end of the calculation period 
2 weeks, overlapping with the last week of the calculation period 
Minimum daily 
balances in the 
maintenance 
period 
0%, provided that the reserve requirement is met 
on average over the maintenance period  
80% of the reservable base, and provided that the reserve 
requirement is met on average over the maintenance period  
1/ Bound values refer to daily averages of reservable deposits. For the US, net deposits correspond to total deposits less amounts due from 
other depository institutions and less cash items in the process of collection. In Brazil, cash items in the process of collection are also 
deducted from the reservable base. 
2/ These institutions are usually the ones with a low record of transactions deposits. More accurately, the FRB clarifies that an institution 
with net transaction accounts greater than the exemption amount for either of the two weeks and with total deposits less than the 
nonexempt deposit cutoff for both weeks will continue to submit the FR 2900 on a quarterly basis. An institution with net transaction 
accounts less than or equal to the exemption amount for both of the two report weeks and with total deposits less than the reduced 
reporting limit for both of the report weeks will no longer be required to submit the FR 2900. 
Source: FRB and Central Bank of Brazil (www.bcb.gov.br)   33 










# of firms in the 
sample 
1 Sep.  17
th, 1998 
Time deposits: instead of depositing reserves that accrued the TBC rate, banks 
were required to invest in federal securities 
Jul. 13




2 May  6
th, 1999  Time deposits: reduction in reserve requirement ratio to 25% from 26.5% 
Apr. 19
th, 1999 to May 
4
th, 1999 and May 24
th, 
1999 to Jun. 30
th, 1999 
38 83 
3 Jul.  7
th, 1999  Time deposits: reduction in reserve requirement ratio to 20% from 25% 
May 24




4 Oct.  10
th, 1999  Time deposits: reduction in reserve requirement ratio to 0% from 10% 
Oct. 25




5 Mar.  14
th, 2000 
Transaction accounts: reduction in reserve requirement ratio to 55% from 65% 
2/ 
Oct. 25




6 Sep.  28
th, 2000  Transaction accounts: reduction in reserve requirement calculation base 
Oct. 19




7 Feb.  19
th, 2003 
Transaction accounts: increase in reserve requirement ratio to 60% from 45% 
and increase in exempted base 
Mar. 19




1/ We thank an anonymous referee for mentioning that in events 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7, the announcement was made after the market had closed. Therefore the D0 impact day was chosen 
as the first business day following the announcement. 
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Event 1
Financial System Non-Financial System
β t-test p-value R2 F p-value β t-test p-value R2 F p-value
Ibovespa 1.13 6.24 0.00 0.48 39.00 0.00  Ibovespa 2.28 14.82 0.00 0.84 219.56 0.00 





















D-2 -8.8% -3.22*** -3.22*** D-2 1.6% 0.77 0.77
D-1 3.3% 1.39 1.39 D-1 -3.3% -1.62 -1.62
D0 0.8% 0.33 0.33 D0 1.2% 0.61 0.61
D+1 0.4% 0.18 0.18 D+1 -1.8% -0.88 -0.88
D+2 -1.1% -0.47 -0.47 D+2 -0.6% -0.30 -0.30
D+3 -3.8% -1.60 -1.60 D+3 2.3% 1.15 1.15
Total           D-
2 to D0
-4.8% -1.29 -1.44
Total      
D-2 to D0
0.00 -0.13 -0.20
Total       D+1 
to D+3
-4.4% -0.40 -0.65
Total      
D+1 to 
0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Total           D-
2 to D+3
-9.2% -1.42 -17.78***
Total      
D-2 to D+3
-0.01 -0.02 3.06***
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test)
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
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Event 2
Financial System Non-Financial System
β t-test p-value R2 F p-value β t-test p-value R2 F p-value
Ibovespa 1.06 4.10 0.00 0.32 16.80 0.00  Ibovespa 1.93 6.38 0.00 0.53 40.72 0.00 





















D-2 -0.2% -0.11 -0.11 D-2 1.8% 1.00 1.00
D-1 4.1% 2.69** 2.69** D-1 1.0% 0.59 0.59
D0 1.3% 0.89 0.89 D0 0.4% 0.20 0.20
D+1 2.8% 1.88* 1.88* D+1 1.1% 0.65 0.65
D+2 3.5% 2.37** 2.37** D+2 -1.0% -0.55 -0.55
D+3 2.7% 1.78* 1.78* D+3 -2.3% -1.30 -1.30
Total           D-
2 to D0
5.3% 6.55** 1.18
Total       
D-2 to D0
3.1% 1.05 1.80
Total       D+1 
to D+3
9.0% 2.40 1.84
Total       
D+1 to D+3
-2.1% -1.74 -1.31
Total           D-
2 to D+3
8.3% 1.72 3.02***
Total       
D-2 to D+3
2.5% 0.85 4.50***
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test)
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
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Event 3
Financial System Non-Financial System
β t-test p-value R2 F p-value β t-test p-value R2 F p-value
Ibovespa 1.07 4.62 0.00 0.43 21.35 0.00  Ibovespa 1.74 8.81 0.00 0.73 77.57 0.00 





















D-2 1.3% 1.07 1.07 D-2 0.2% 0.16 0.16
D-1 -0.1% -0.08 -0.08 D-1 0.3% 0.32 0.32
D0 0.8% 0.63 0.63 D0 1.5% 1.45 1.45
D+1 1.6% 1.28 1.28 D+1 2.1% 2.09** 2.09**
D+2 -1.7% -1.37 -1.37 D+2 -1.4% -1.35 -1.35
D+3 1.0% 0.82 0.82 D+3 1.4% 1.38 1.38
Total           D-
2 to D0
2.0% 0.66 0.99
Total      
D-2 to D0
2.0% 0.61 0.83
Total       D+1 
to D+3
0.9% 0.75 0.66
Total      
D+1 to 
2.2% 1.74 1.25
Total           D-
2 to D+3
2.3% 1.29 0.21
Total      
D-2 to D+3
3.9% 1.82 0.14
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test)
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
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Event 4
Financial System Non-Financial System
β t-test p-value R2 F p-value β t-test p-value R2 F p-value
Ibovespa 1.21 4.01 0.00 0.15 16.05 0.00  Ibovespa 1.73 6.91 0.00 0.34 47.78 0.00 





















D-2 3.6% 1.58 1.58 D-2 -0.01 -0.32 -0.32
D-1 0.6% 0.27 0.27 D-1 0.01 0.47 0.47
D0 -0.3% -0.14 -0.14 D0 0.01 0.57 0.57
D+1 -1.8% -0.79 -0.79 D+1 0.00 -0.23 -0.23
D+2 -1.8% -0.77 -0.77 D+2 -0.01 -0.73 -0.73
D+3 -0.5% -0.22 -0.22 D+3 0.00 0.12 0.12
Total           D-
2 to D0
3.9% 3.02* 1.83
Total      
D-2 to D0
1.4% 0.98 0.86
Total       D+1 
to D+3
-4.1% -1.15 -1.20
Total      
D+1 to 
-1.6% -1.00 -1.09
Total           D-
2 to D+3
-1.5% -0.05 0.37
Total      
D-2 to D+3
1.5% -0.09 1.24
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test)
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
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Event 5
Financial System Non-Financial System
β t-test p-value R2 F p-value β t-test p-value R2 F p-value
Ibovespa 0.50 1.83 0.07 0.04 3.35 0.07  Ibovespa 1.89 6.51 0.00 0.32 42.43 0.00 





















D-2 0.8% 0.35 0.35 D-2 0.2% 0.09 0.09
D-1 0.0% 0.02 0.02 D-1 0.2% 0.08 0.08
D0 0.6% 0.29 0.29 D0 0.7% 0.32 0.32
D+1 3.0% 1.43 1.43 D+1 0.1% 0.05 0.05
D+2 -0.1% -0.05 -0.05 D+2 0.0% -0.02 -0.02
D+3 -0.4% -0.19 -0.19 D+3 -0.5% -0.21 -0.21
Total           D-
2 to D0
1.4% 0.43 0.67
Total      
D-2 to D0
1.1% 2.15 0.40
Total       D+1 
to D+3
2.5% 3.78* 2.65**
Total      
D+1 to 
-0.4% -0.74 -0.16
Total           D-
2 to D+3
3.6% 5.53*** -1.03
Total      
D-2 to D+3
1.0% 0.38 0.45
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test)
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)

















   39 
Event 6
Financial System Non-Financial System
β t-test p-value R2 F p-value β t-test p-value R2 F p-value
Ibovespa 1.12 5.70 0.00 0.41 32.48 0.00  Ibovespa 1.55 8.52 0.00 0.61 72.60 0.00 





















D-2 -3.6% -2.88*** -2.88*** D-2 0.6% 0.53 0.53
D-1 -1.1% -0.90 -0.90 D-1 1.0% 0.93 0.93
D0 0.1% 0.06 0.06 D0 -0.4% -0.39 -0.39
D+1 -1.1% -0.91 -0.91 D+1 0.2% 0.18 0.18
D+2 1.6% 1.29 1.29 D+2 1.3% 1.24 1.24
D+3 -0.3% -0.26 -0.26 D+3 0.1% 0.06 0.06
Total           D-
2 to D0
-4.6% -1.89 -1.75
Total      
D-2 to D0
1.1% 0.95 0.85
Total       D+1 
to D+3
0.2% 0.05 0.06
Total      
D+1 to 
1.6% 1.26 1.17
Total           D-
2 to D+3
-2.2% -1.13 -0.46
Total      
D-2 to D+3
0.8% 1.25 -1.87*
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test)
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
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Event 7
Financial System Non-Financial System
β t-test p-value R2 F p-value β t-test p-value R2 F p-value
Ibovespa 1.70 3.67 0.00 0.18 17.50 0.00  Ibovespa 1.41 7.66 0.00 0.49 58.67 0.00 





















D-2 0.6% 0.23 0.23 D-2 0.5% 0.48 0.48
D-1 -2.6% -0.91 -0.91 D-1 -0.2% -0.16 -0.16
D0 0.7% 0.27 0.27 D0 0.8% 0.75 0.75
D+1 0.0% 0.01 0.01 D+1 -5.9% -5.75*** -5.75***
D+2 -1.2% -0.43 -0.43 D+2 -0.4% -0.40 -0.40
D+3 1.3% 0.48 0.48 D+3 -1.3% -1.22 -1.22
Total           D-
2 to D0
-1.2% -0.54 -0.44
Total      
D-2 to D0
1.1% 0.22 0.29
Total       D+1 
to D+3
0.2% 0.05 0.05
Total      
D+1 to 
-7.6% -9.13** -4.74***
Total           D-
2 to D+3
-1.8% -0.23 -8.71***
Total      
D-2 to D+3
-5.3% -2.33* 2.84***
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test)
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test)


















Table 6 – Estimation of the Market Model and Tests for Abnormal Returns Using 
Aggregated Portfolios 
Event 1  
OLS 
   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.13 6.24  0.00 0.48  39.00  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  1.32 6.90  0.00    0.53  47.65  0.00 
              









Z-test      
D-2  -8.8% -3.22***  -3.22***         
D-1  3.3% 1.39 1.39         
D0  0.8% 0.33 0.33         
D+1  0.4% 0.18 0.18         
D+2  -1.1% -0.47 -0.47         
D+3  -3.8% -1.60 -1.60         
Total D-2 to 
D0  -4.8% -1.29 -1.44         
Total D+1 to 







Total D-2 to 
D+3  -9.2%     -1.42  -17.78***       
 
OLS 
   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  2.28 14.82  0.00 0.84  219.56  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  2.57 15.60  0.00 0.85  243.39  0.00 
             








Z-test      
D-2  1.6% 0.77 0.77         
D-1  -3.3% -1.62 -1.62         
D0  1.2% 0.61 0.61         
D+1  -1.8% -0.88 -0.88         
D+2  -0.6% -0.30 -0.30         
D+3  2.3% 1.15 1.15         
Total D-2 to 
D0  0.00 -0.13  -0.20         
Total D+1 to 








Total D-2 to 
D+3  -0.01     -0.02  3.06***       
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test) 
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test) 






   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.06 4.10  0.00 0.32  16.80  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  1.23 4.40  0.00    0.35  19.33  0.00 
              









Z-test      
D-2  -0.2% -0.11 -0.11         
D-1  4.1% 2.69**  2.69**         
D0  1.3% 0.89 0.89         
D+1  2.8% 1.88*  1.88*         
D+2  3.5% 2.37**  2.37**         
D+3  2.7% 1.78*  1.78*         
Total D-2 to 
D0  5.3% 6.55** 1.18         
Total D+1 to 







Total D-2 to 
D+3  8.3%     1.72  3.02***       
 
OLS 
   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.93 6.38  0.00 0.53  40.72  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  2.18 6.59  0.00 0.55  43.49  0.00 
             








Z-test      
D-2  1.8% 1.00 1.00         
D-1  1.0% 0.59 0.59         
D0  0.4% 0.20 0.20         
D+1  1.1% 0.65 0.65         
D+2  -1.0% -0.55 -0.55         
D+3  -2.3% -1.30 -1.30         
Total D-2 to 
D0  3.1% 1.05 1.80         
Total D+1 to 








Total D-2 to 
D+3  2.5%     0.85  4.50***       
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test) 
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test) 





   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.07 4.62  0.00 0.43  21.35  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  1.27 5.16  0.00    0.49  26.61  0.00 
              









Z-test      
D-2  1.3% 1.07 1.07         
D-1  -0.1% -0.08 -0.08         
D0  0.8% 0.63 0.63         
D+1  1.6% 1.28 1.28         
D+2  -1.7% -1.37 -1.37         
D+3  1.0% 0.82 0.82         
Total D-2 to 
D0  2.0% 0.66 0.99         
Total D+1 to 







Total D-2 to 
D+3  2.3%     1.29  0.21       
 
OLS 
   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.74 8.81  0.00 0.73  77.57  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  1.99 9.64  0.00 0.77  92.98  0.00 
             








Z-test      
D-2  0.2% 0.16 0.16         
D-1  0.3% 0.32 0.32         
D0  1.5% 1.45 1.45         
D+1  2.1% 2.09**  2.09**         
D+2  -1.4% -1.35 -1.35         
D+3  1.4% 1.38 1.38         
Total D-2 to 
D0  2.0% 0.61 0.83         
Total D+1 to 








Total D-2 to 
D+3  3.9%     1.82  0.14       
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test) 
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test) 






   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.21 4.01  0.00 0.15  16.05  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  1.53 4.53  0.00    0.18  20.51  0.00 
              









Z-test      
D-2  3.6% 1.58 1.58         
D-1  0.6% 0.27 0.27         
D0  -0.3% -0.14 -0.14         
D+1  -1.8% -0.79 -0.79         
D+2  -1.8% -0.77 -0.77         
D+3  -0.5% -0.22 -0.22         
Total D-2 to 
D0  3.9% 3.02* 1.83         
Total D+1 to 







Total D-2 to 
D+3  -1.5%     -0.05  0.37       
 
OLS 
   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.73 6.91  0.00 0.34  47.78  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  2.05 7.29  0.00 0.37  53.15  0.00 
             








Z-test      
D-2  -0.01 -0.32  -0.32         
D-1  0.01 0.47  0.47         
D0  0.01 0.57  0.57         
D+1  0.00 -0.23  -0.23         
D+2  -0.01 -0.73  -0.73         
D+3  0.00 0.12  0.12         
Total D-2 to 
D0  1.4% 0.98 0.86         
Total D+1 to 








Total D-2 to 
D+3  1.5%     -0.09  1.24       
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test) 
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test) 






   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  0.50 1.83  0.07 0.04  3.35  0.07   
Market 
Model 
IBx  0.61 2.00  0.05    0.04  3.98  0.05 
              









Z-test      
D-2  0.8% 0.35 0.35         
D-1  0.0% 0.02 0.02         
D0  0.6% 0.29 0.29         
D+1  3.0% 1.43 1.43         
D+2  -0.1% -0.05 -0.05         
D+3  -0.4% -0.19 -0.19         
Total D-2 to 
D0  1.4% 0.43 0.67         
Total D+1 to 







Total D-2 to 
D+3  3.6%     5.53***  -1.03       
 
OLS 
   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.89 6.51  0.00 0.32  42.43  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  2.16 6.53  0.00 0.32  42.69  0.00 
             








Z-test      
D-2  0.2% 0.09 0.09         
D-1  0.2% 0.08 0.08         
D0  0.7% 0.32 0.32         
D+1  0.1% 0.05 0.05         
D+2  0.0% -0.02  -0.02         
D+3  -0.5% -0.21 -0.21         
Total D-2 to 
D0  1.1% 2.15 0.40         
Total D+1 to 








Total D-2 to 
D+3  1.0%     0.38  0.45       
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test) 
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test) 






   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.12 5.70  0.00 0.41  32.48  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  1.35 5.85  0.00    0.43  34.28  0.00 
              









Z-test      
D-2  -3.6% -2.88***  -2.88***         
D-1  -1.1% -0.90 -0.90         
D0  0.1% 0.06 0.06         
D+1  -1.1% -0.91 -0.91         
D+2  1.6% 1.29 1.29         
D+3  -0.3% -0.26 -0.26         
Total D-2 to 
D0  -4.6% -1.89 -1.75         
Total D+1 to 







Total D-2 to 
D+3  -2.2%     -1.13  -0.46       
 
OLS 
   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.55 8.52  0.00 0.61  72.60  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  1.93 9.64  0.00 0.67  92.95  0.00 
             








Z-test      
D-2  0.6% 0.53 0.53         
D-1  1.0% 0.93 0.93         
D0  -0.4% -0.39 -0.39         
D+1  0.2% 0.18 0.18         
D+2  1.3% 1.24 1.24         
D+3  0.1% 0.06 0.06         
Total D-2 to 
D0  1.1% 0.95 0.85         
Total D+1 to 








Total D-2 to 
D+3  0.8%     1.25  -1.87*       
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test) 
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test) 






   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.70 3.67  0.00 0.18  17.50  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  1.48 2.05  0.05    0.06  4.19  0.04 
              









Z-test      
D-2  0.6% 0.23 0.23         
D-1  -2.6% -0.91 -0.91         
D0  0.7% 0.27 0.27         
D+1  0.0% 0.01 0.01         
D+2  -1.2% -0.43 -0.43         
D+3  1.3% 0.48 0.48         
Total D-2 to 
D0  -1.2% -0.54 -0.44         
Total D+1 to 







Total D-2 to 
D+3  -1.8%     -0.23  -8.71***       
 
OLS 
   ￿ t-test  p-value  R2 F  p-value 
Ibovespa  1.41 7.66  0.00 0.49  58.67  0.00   
Market 
Model 
IBx  2.08 7.75  0.00 0.49  60.11  0.00 
             








Z-test      
D-2  0.5% 0.48 0.48         
D-1  -0.2% -0.16 -0.16         
D0  0.8% 0.75 0.75         
D+1  -5.9% -5.75***  -5.75***         
D+2  -0.4% -0.40 -0.40         
D+3  -1.3% -1.22 -1.22         
Total D-2 to 
D0  1.1% 0.22 0.29         
Total D+1 to 








Total D-2 to 
D+3  -5.3%     -2.33*  2.84***       
* Rejects null hypothesis at 0.10 level (two-tailed test) 
** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.05 level (two-tailed test) 
*** Rejects null hypothesis at 0.01 level (two-tailed test) 
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